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Article 9

REMOVING FROM STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Emily M. Rector*

INTRODUCTION

It is doubtful that appointees to the federal judiciary expect their
posts will require them to stand in the shoes of, say, the Mississippi
Motor Vehicle Commission,' the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, 2 or the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.3 Equating a federal court with a state administrative agency seems strange, at
the very least. What business do federal courts have in the dealings of
Mississippi car lots, or Illinois beer distributorships? Perhaps justifiably, there is a mental disconnect between our visions of federal courts
and state administrative agencies. They do, after all, find themselves
separated by both horizontal and vertical institutional barriers. State
administrative agencies are insulated vertically from federal courts
through our federal system of government. Moreover, state agencies
and federal courts are horizontally disconnected through separation
of powers-agencies occupy a position in the executive branch while
federal courts are positioned in the judiciary.
In spite of these institutional barriers, removal jurisdiction 4 has
the potential to provide a direct link between state agencies and federal courts. In the normal course of things, removal jurisdiction permits federal courts to hear matters which were originally commenced
in state courts, provided the federal court has original jurisdiction
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., Spanish,
University of Michigan, 2005. 1 would like to thank Professors Jay Tidmarsh and
Jeannette Cox for their help and advice.
1 For a general overview of the agency, see Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission, http://www.mmvc.state.ms.us/mmvc/MotorVeh.nsf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
2 For a general overview of the agency, see Illinois Liquor Control Commission,
http://www.state.il.us/LCC (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
3 For a general overview of the agency, see Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, http://werc.wi.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
4 The general removal statute is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
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over the claim. 5 Procedurally, the defendant petitions the district
court to take hold of the matter. 6 At that point, the state court's jurisdiction ceases, and the case is lodged in the district court. 7 The district court's jurisdiction is then subject to remand either at the
plaintiff's request or on the judge's own motion.8 Thus, removal jurisdiction is a procedural mechanism which typically permits federal
courts to render judgments in matters commenced in state courts.
Through this same procedural mechanism, however, defendants
have also petitioned federal courts to take hold of proceedings commenced in state administrativebodies,9 and, surprisingly, in some cases
the federal judiciary has accepted the invitation.1 0 What follows is a
strange turn of events. A proceeding instituted in, for example, the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission suddenly finds itself
whisked off to federal court. A state administrative law judge is
swapped for an Article III judge, and the relative informality of administrative adjudication gives way to a full blown federal trial. 1
What permits removal from a state agency? The federal removal
statute 12 allows a defendant to transfer "any civil action brought in a
5 A federal district court has original jurisdiction in federal question, diversity,
admiralty, and many other kinds of civil actions. See id. §§ 1331-1333.
6 See id. § 1446(a) ("A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil
action ...

shall file in the district court ...

a notice of removal ...

containing a short

and plain statement of the grounds for removal .... ").
7 See id. § 1446(d) ("[T]he filing of such notice of removal ... shall effect the
removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is
remanded.").
8 See id. § 1447(c).
9 Indeed, defendants have petitioned for removal from each of the agencies
mentioned here. SeeWirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc., 224 F.3d
708, 710 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering removal from the Illinois Liquor Control Commission); Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1101 (7th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (considering removal from the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission); Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 975, 976
(S.D. Miss. 2000) (considering removal from the Mississippi Motor Vehicles
Commission).
10 See, e.g., Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 40
(1st Cir. 1972) (permitting removal from a labor relations board).
11 See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 437 (1974)
("[O]nce a case has been removed to federal court, it is settled that federal rather
than state law governs the future course of proceedings . . . ."); see also CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, 20 FEDERAL PRACTCE & PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 42, at 336
(2002) ("A removed case proceeds according to federal procedural rules, as though it
had originally been commenced in federal court ....
).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). Here I exclusively discuss the general removal
statute; for a discussion of "specialized" bases for removal, see Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 634-35 (2004).

2009]

REMOVING

FROM

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES

2271

State court' where a federal district court can exercise original jurisdiction.13 Whether to treat an administrative agency as "State court" for
the purposes of the removal statute has recently sparked debate in the
federal courts. 1 4 Two camps have formed. One clutches the words of
the removal statute as conclusive proof that an action before a "noncourt" such as an administrative agency is not removable. 15 I label this
view the "formalist" approach. The other camp treats the words of the
statute as a starting point, insisting upon a functional approach that
considers the agency's powers and essential nature to determine its
"courtness," and from there determines whether the action is removable. 1 6 I call this competing view the "functional" approach.
Each approach is fraught with difficulties. The central problem
with the formalist approach lies in its premise that courts and agencies
are inherently different. Recent developments have, to a degree,
blurred the distinction between state agencies and state courts. Below
I explore the growing similarity between state courts and state agencies in terms of the disputes that they handle as well as in terms of
their institutional structuring. I contend that treating removal from a
state court as proper while barring removal from a state agency perhaps does not make sense, given that state agencies are increasingly
judicial in character.
The functional test comes with its own set of difficulties. In particular, the functional test's assessment of the agency's "courtness" is a
highly elastic analysis, which runs the risk of becoming an unprincipled inquiry. Further, there are conflicts among courts about how the
test is to be applied-for instance, whether to analyze the "courtness"
of the agency's operations as a whole, or to analyze how court-like the
agency is in handling the particulardispute. Lastly, the functional test
creates an opportunity for unequal treatment of diversity and federal
question cases even though such disparate treatment is not sanctioned
by the removal statute.
After surveying the difficulties with the current formal and functional approaches, I conclude that there must be a better way to sort
out the "agency removal problem." At the close of this Note, I formu13 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (emphasis added).
14 SeeJason Johnston, Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., ex rel. Richardson v.
U.S. West Communications: Can Administrative Agencies Be Considered Courtsfor the Purposes of Removal?, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 449, 449 (2002); see also Rockville HarleyDavidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d 673, 676 (D. Md. 2002)
("Whether removal can extend to proceedings before administrative agencies has
generated substantial debate in the federal courts.").
15 See infra Part I.
16 See infra Part II.
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late a new functional approach. This new functional approach is an
adaptation of the inquiry developed in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,17 which considered the extent to which Congress may
delegate judicial power to non-Article III decisionmakers, such as federal agencies. I contend that the "modified Schor inquiry" is better
than the current formalist and functional tests. It disentangles the
many competing concerns underlying the agency removal problem,
and it promises to fix some of the practical problems courts have had
in applying the current tests.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I begins by summarizing the
formalist approach to removal adopted by the Ninth Circuit and
surveys the disputes handled by modern state agencies and their institutional structuring. This Part proceeds to question whether it is
proper to treat agencies as distinct from courts in the context of
removal. Part II then outlines the alternative approach to agency
removal, the functional tests adopted by the First and Seventh Circuits, and identifies the practical and conceptual problems that these
tests present. Part III presents a new answer to the removal question,
sketching a test derived from the Schor case.
I.

THE FORMALIST APPROACH TO AGENCY REMOVAL
AND ATTENDANT DIFFICULTIES

This Part addresses the formalist approach to agency removal. It
begins by outlining the approach, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit
in Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries v. U.S. West Communications,
Inc.18 This Part then further explores the formalist approach's sharp
distinction between state courts and state agencies. If the body adjudicating the dispute is a court, removal is permitted; if the body adjudicating the dispute is denominated an agency, however, removal is not
permitted. This Part then proceeds to question whether making a distinction between state courts and state agencies in the context of
removal is logical in light of two considerations. One, the disputes
before state agencies and state courts may not be distinct. Two, state
agencies are developing a resemblance to state courts in terms of their
institutional structuring.
A.

The FormalistApproach: Looking to the Federal Removal Statute

One approach to the question of whether actions before state
agencies may be removed to federal court is to look to the literal lan17 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
18 288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002).
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guage of the federal removal statute. Oregon Bureau provides an example of this approach. Oregon Bureau involved allegations that U.S.
West discriminated against one of its employees after he "accompanied an Oregon state safety compliance officer on an inspection of a
U.S. West facility." 19 The employee took his complaint against U.S.
West to the Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI), an administrative
body created under the authority of Oregon law. 20

U.S. West

removed to the District Court for the District of Oregon on the basis
of federal question jurisdiction. 21 BOLI sought remand, but the district court held that removal was authorized under the statute and
denied its motion for remand. 22 BOLI subsequently sought review in
the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit looked to the plain text of the removal statute:
"The issue of whether BOLI is a 'state court' for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (a) is a statutory construction question ....We look first to the
statutory language. If it is clear and consistent with the statutory
scheme, the plain language is conclusive and our inquiry goes no further." 23 The court found the statutory term "State court" to be clear
and consistent with the statutory scheme, and that there was no ambiguity inherent in the term "State court." 24 Because the term "State
court" was not ambiguous, the court held that a literal application of
the statutory text decided the case. In the court's view, only civil
actions "brought in a State court" are removable, and in the case
before it, neither party had argued that BOLI was a "State court" in
the formal sense. Thus, remand was required:
It is undisputed that BOLI is not a court. The parties agree that
BOLI is an administrative agency, albeit one that, like many others,
conducts court-like adjudications. Thus, we again need go no further. Because BOLI is not a court, the BOLI proceedings were not
court therefore
removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The district
25
erred in denying BOLI's motion to remand.
Simply put, the Ninth Circuit decided agencies are agencies and
courts are courts, and only proceedings from the latter are removable
under the plain text of the removal statute.
19

Id. at 415.

20
21
22

Id.
Id.

24
25

Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 418.

See Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. U.S. West Comm'ns, Inc., No. 00-883-KI,
2000 WL 1635699, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 31, 2000).
23 Or. Bureau, 288 F.3d at 417 (footnotes omitted).
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U.S. West, which opposed remand, argued that the removal statute recognized a gray area between agency and court.2 6 It asserted

that the statutory term "State court" should be read "to encompass
court-like administrative agency adjudications."' 27 Since BOLI was a
court in the functional sense-it was empowered to handle the proceeding in a court-like way-proceedings commenced before it could
be removed to federal court. 28 The Ninth Circuit disagreed; the
agency's court-like functioning was insufficient to place it within the
reach of the removal statute. 29 According to the court, the removal
statute does not permit "removal of proceedings from an administrative agency, regardless of how court-like the proceedings may be." 30
Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected any sort of functional approach to
the removal statute and instead adopted a "formalist" approach,
whereby removal is only authorized if the proceedings are before an
entity formally labeled a court.
The Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals to have adopted
the "formalist" approach, but such an approach may be gaining some
ground at the district court level. In Johnson v. Albertson's LLC,3 1 the
District Court for the Northern District of Florida adopted the formalist analysis. 3 2 Johnson considered the propriety of removal from the
Florida Commission on Human Rights (FCHR). Plaintiff Carolyn
Johnson was an employee of the grocer Albertson's who brought a
discrimination claim before the Commission. 3 3 Johnson contended
that Albertson's discriminated against her on account of her race,
gender, age, and disability in violation of Florida law and several federal statutes. 34 Albertson's removed the action from the Commission
to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, and
35
Johnson moved to remand.
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Johnson court adopted the formalist
approach and expressly declined to look at the functions of the
agency from which the action was removed. The court decided that
its analysis "need not extend beyond the statute's plain language,
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 419.
Id.
No. 3:08cv236, 2008 WL 3286988 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2008).
See id. at *1.
See id. at *2 (detailing the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge).
34
35

See id.
See id.
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which does not authorize removal of proceedings to [a district court]
from an administrative agency." 36 Therefore, because the court readily concluded that a "state administrative agency is not a 'State court'
for purposes of § 1441," the court decided it did not need to "analyze
the nature and type of functions performed by the FCHR."37 The
Johnson court echoed the formalist approach of the Ninth Circuit: a
court is a court and an agency is an agency, and removal jurisdiction
only extends to proceedings before courts.
Both the Ninth Circuit in Oregon Bureau and the Johnson court
adhere to a strict dichotomy: courts are courts and agencies are agencies. As a result, there can be no agency that is a court within the
meaning of the removal statute. On the face of each opinion, it is said
that the plain language of the removal statute is conclusive; the
agency from which the action was removed is not in fact a "State
court" within the meaning of the statute. But, neither opinion ventures a definition of "State court." Presumably, for a tribunal to be a
"State court" from which removal is permitted, the tribunal must be a
"court" under the state's nomenclature and it must fall squarely within
the state's judicial branch as opposed to the executive branch. However, neither opinion defines a "State court" as such explicitly. Definitional uncertainties aside, the formalist approach attempts to provide
a simple solution to the administrative removal problem: disallow
removal from any agency.
B.

Questioning the FormalistApproach: Are State Agencies
Truly Different Creatures than State Courts?

The formalist approach is premised upon the notion that state
agencies and state courts cannot be equated. This approach is simple
to apply-removal from a state agency is not permissible, regardless of
how court-like the agency's functioning is. Moreover, its connection
to the statutory text is demonstrable; removal is only permitted when
the action is commenced in a "State court," and an administrative
agency does not constitute a "court." However, are state agencies truly
unlike state courts?
Conventional wisdom, of course, tells us that courts and agencies
are indeed different creatures. They reside in different branches;
courts are positioned in the judicial branch while agencies are a part
of the executive branch. Moreover, they are tasked with distinct
responsibilities. Courts resolve disputes. Some agencies, too, may
take on an adjudicative role that parallels a court, but many others
36
37

Id.
See id. at *1.
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concentrate on tasks-for instance rulemaking-that have no easy
analogue in the judiciary.
While conventional wisdom soundly rejects equating court with
agency, recent developments in the area of state administrative law
have somewhat blurred the distinction between state agencies and
state courts. This blurring is evident in two respects. One, there is a
growing similarity in the disputes handled by state courts and state
agencies. Two, the institutional structures states use to carry out
administrative adjudications increasingly imitate the institutional
structuring of state judiciaries. Below I discuss each of these trends in
turn with the ultimate goal of questioning whether court and agency
necessarily demand different treatment in the context of removal.
1. Similarity in Disputes Handled
The conventional wisdom suggests that state courts and state
agencies are different creatures. However, in reality they may bear a
closer resemblance than the conventional wisdom suggests. Disputes
that were previously resolved only before state courts have found their
way into administrative forums, suggesting that courts and (at least
some) agencies play similar roles. Workers' compensation schemes
provide an obvious example. Prior to such schemes, matters regarding injured employees were under the purview of the courts. 38
Workers' compensation is one area where state agencies have
taken on adjudicative responsibilities previously left to courts, but it is
not the only one. Recently, some states have taken further steps to
shift adjudication of rights from the court system to agencies. For
example, the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program 39 shifts adjudication of certain medical malpractice
40
claims from traditional state courts to a state administrative agency.

The program provides for an administrative adjudication before the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission in cases of birth-related
neurological injury. 4 1 The enabling legislation expressly provides that
a proceeding before the Commission displaces a civil action in a state
court: "[R] ights and remedies herein granted to an infant on account
38

SeeJohn G. Farrell, Administrative Alternatives to Judicial Branch Congestion, 27J.

NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 7 (2007).

39 See Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program, http://
www.vabirthinjury.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
40 See Farrell, supra note 38, at 13; see also Matthew Hitzhusen, Note, Crisis and
Reform: Is New Zealand's No-Fault Compensation System a ReasonableAlternative to the Medical Malpractice Crisis in the United States?, 22 Amiz. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 649, 687 (2005)
(detailing the Virginia program).
41 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5003 (West 2001).
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of a birth-related neurological injury shall exclude all other rights and
remedies of such infant. ' 42 Florida, too, has shifted jurisdiction of
such matters to an administrative agency.4 3 The Florida Birth-Related

Neurological Injury Compensation Association is structured like the
Virginia program-a legislatively created entity provides the exclusive
remedy for birth-related neurological injury claims. 44 While the Florida and Virginia programs are limited in scope, they provide certain
evidence that states are creating an administrative judiciary to take
over some functions that were traditionally held by state court
45
systems.
The Florida and Virginia programs likely reflect states' desire to
reap the benefits of agency adjudication. Agencies are known for
their "expertise, efficiency, low cost to the claimant, and [their ability
to handle] high case volumes." 46 States recognize that certain kinds
of disputes are well-suited to permit exploitation of these benefits, and
consequently they elect to transfer those claims from courts to agencies. The transfer of some claims to agencies can be understood as a
policy choice driven by the desire to capitalize on the benefits of
agency adjudication.
If we assume that a primary reason states direct some claims to an
administrative agency instead of a court is the state's desire to capitalize on the benefits of administrative adjudication, then it becomes difficult to argue that there is an inherent difference between the
disputes adjudicated by agencies as opposed to courts. Suppose a
chain of events giving rise to a cause of action for birth-related neurological injury occurs in Virginia, and also in Michigan, which has not
passed legislation handing such claims over to an administrative
agency. Suppose further that the parties are diverse and the jurisdictional amount is met, such that a federal court would have original
jurisdiction over both the Virginia and Michigan claims. Under the
formalist analysis, the defendant in the Virginia action would not be
entitled to removal-the claim against him was commenced in admin42 Id. § 38.2-5002(B) (emphasis added). The program constitutes the exclusive
remedy except in cases where there is "clear and convincing evidence" of intentional
wrongdoing by the physician or hospital. Id. § 38.2-5002(C).
43 See Farrell, supra note 38, at 13.
44 FLA. STAT. ANN. §766.303 (West 2005); Hitzhusen, supra note 40, at 687-88.
45 For a concise overview of matters now handled by state administrative agencies
which were traditionally handled by state judiciaries, see Farrell, supra note 38, at
7-15. Moreover, there are those who advocate for administrative agencies to take
over even more functions from the judiciary. See id. at 18-26.
46 Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency to Make
Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 280 (2003).
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istrative agency, which is not a "State court" under the removal statute.
The defendant in the Michigan action, having been sued in a Michigan state court, would be entitled to removal. The defendant in the
Michigan action can seek removal since Michigan has not seen fit to
shift adjudication of the particular type of claim to an agency. The
defendant in the Virginia action, on the other hand, has no chance of
removal as Virginia has sought to capitalize on many pluses of administrative adjudication by placing the claim against him before an
agency. These similar disputes end up before both agencies and
courts as a result of state policy choice, and that policy choice determines whether the defendant can remove.
As demonstrated above, in some situations, the placement of a
dispute before a state agency rather than a court may be the result of a
state policy choice. There are other situations in which states have not
elected to shift jurisdiction over a type of dispute entirely to an administrative agencies; instead states permit agencies to exercise "concurrent jurisdiction" with traditional state courts over certain matters. In
such situations the fact that an agency is adjudicating the matter is a
result of the plaintiffs choice. The plaintiff could seek relief from a
traditional state court or an agency, but, for whatever reason the
plaintiff chose an administrative forum.
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc. 47 is one

such example where the plaintiff was presented with the option of
either state court or an administrative agency. The case involved a
contract dispute between telecommunications carriers; BellSouth
48
claimed Vartec underpaid access charges over a six-year period.
BellSouth sought relief from the Florida Public Service Commission,
an administrative agency granted authority under Florida law to
resolve disputes between carriers. 49 However, as the court expressly
indicated, nothing prevented BellSouth from seeking relief in a Florida circuit court. 50 Moreover, since the parties were diverse and the
amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional minimum, a federal court could have entertained original jurisdiction over the
5
action. 1
While the BellSouth court adopted the functional test for removal,
discussed in Part II, it is worth pausing to consider how removal would
47 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Fla. 2002).
48 See id. at 1281.
49 See id. at 1283.
50 See id. at 1281 ("Had BellSouth sought resolution of this same dispute by filing
a civil action in a Florida circuit court, removal ...would have been proper.").
51 See id. ("It is undisputed that BellSouth is a citizen of Georgia, Vartec is a citizen of Texas, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.").
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be handled under the formalist approach. Under the formalist
approach, the availability of removal would be predicated on the
plaintiffs forum choice. The plaintiff chose an administrative forum,
entirely ruling out removal under the formalist approach. (Recall
that the formalist approach only permits removal from entities
denominated "courts." 52 ) Had the plaintiff elected a Florida trial
court, removal would have been available under the formalist
approach. Thus, under the formalist approach, the availability of
removal may rest on the plaintiffs choice of forum, even though the
underlying dispute remains the same regardless of the plaintiffs
election.
As the neurological injury programs and BellSouth demonstrate,
disputes handled by state agencies are not necessarily distinct from
those handled by state courts. State policy choices may result in an
agency handling a particular type of dispute as opposed to a court, as
in the Florida and Virginia programs. Also, the plaintiffs choice of
forum may lead to an agency adjudicating the dispute. So, at least in
some circumstances, it is not possible to distinguish an "agency dispute," that is, a matter heard by an agency, from a "court dispute,"
one heard in a traditional judicial forum. Disputes take on such categorization as an "agency dispute" or "court dispute" due to state policy
choice and the plaintiffs forum choice; otherwise the disputes are
indistinguishable.
If "court disputes" and "agency disputes" are indistinguishable at
least in some circumstances, then the formalist approach is arguably
flawed. The formalist approach is premised on a hard-line distinction
between courts and agencies, and wholly rejects removal of cases from
agencies. But if "agency disputes" are not distinguishable from "court
disputes," then why disallow removal in the former instance, but permit it in the latter?
2.

Similarity in Institutional Structuring

The prior section discusses how the matters themselves heard by
state agencies are sometimes indistinguishable from disputes heard by
state courts. This section discusses how the institutionalstructuresstates
use to carry out administrative adjudication have developed a striking
similarity to the judiciary. The institutional structuring of state administrative agencies is an evolving matter. Recently, there has been a
nation-wide movement toward central panels, an institutional structure that removes state administrative law judges (ALJs) from posts in
52

See supra Part I.A.
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specific state agencies, and places them in their own separate body, to
insulate the ALJs from agency influence. 53 Additionally, perhaps as a
result of the central panel movement, in many states the decision of
the ALJ is considered final-the agency is powerless to override the
ALJ's decision or may only override the ALJ's decision in narrow circumstances. Below I discuss these developments, and how they might
influence the manner in which removal from state agencies should be
handled.
a.

Central Panels: Judicializing the Administrative
Decisionmaker

States have increasingly placed control of administrative adjudication in the hands of a central panel of ALJs as opposed to housing
ALJs within particular agencies. 54 Louisiana opted for a central panel
in 1996, followed by Oregon and Michigan in 2000 and Alaska in
2004.55 All told, twenty-seven states now use central panels. 56 The

central panel movement has the effect of insulating administrative
adjudication from executive influence.5 7 Consequently, administrative adjudication is carried out by an independent body, paralleling
adjudication by the judiciary.
Sketching a brief history of how administrative adjudications were
carried out in the past illuminates how the central panel movement
has extracted administrative adjudication from agency control and
radically 'judicialized" it. In the past, agencies traditionally assigned
the "hearing function" to their own subordinate employees. 58 It was

an informal process:
The responsibility for deciding who would preside over the proceedings at which evidence would be taken, testimony heard and
(perhaps) a transcript made, was not exercised with any great
amount of care or concern. The persons so chosen might or might
not have been lawyers; they might or might not have been independent of peer or staff influence, and they might or might not have
53 John W. Hardwicke, The CentralPanel Movement: A Work in Progress,53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 419, 419-20 & app. (2001).
54 SeeJohn Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The CentralPanel:A Response to Critics,
24J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 231, 231 (2004).
55 See id.
56 See id. For an overview of the states which currently employ central panels, see
Nat'l Ass'n of the Admin. LawJudiciary, Central Panel States, http://www.naalj.org/
panel.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
57 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
58 Frederick Davis, Judicializationof Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and
the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DuKE. L.J. 389, 391.
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been previously involved in investigative or prosecutorial phases of
the proceeding. The sole function of the early presiding officer was
simply to monitor or supervise that phase of the proceeding
wherein the data, information and arguments which the agency had
been told it was required to consider were to be adduced. 59
The cavalier attitude toward the proceedings and the officers presiding before them was justified by the limited influence that the
officer had over the result of the proceedings. 60 The officer "merely
monitored the various materials submitted by interested parties,
organized them, and submitted the resulting 'record' to the agency
heads whom the legislature had charged with the responsibility for
action or nonaction. ''61 Thus, initially, the presiding officer was
hardly analogous to an independent judge with the ability to determine the outcome of the adjudication.
Later, systems were created in which presiding officers not only
were fact-finders, but also recommended a disposition in the matters
before them. 6 2 With this step, "an important threshold had been
crossed: instead of assuming the passive role of receiving and organizing submissions for appraisal by the responsible authority, the presiding officer was assigned the active role of making a significant
contribution to the decisional process. '6 3 Thus, the presiding officer
became more judge-like in one respect; he (at least partially) determined the outcome of the proceedings.
Having the decisionmaker embedded within the agency posed
problems. Unlike an Article III-type judge, the decisionmaker was
not perceived to be impartial. 64 Concerns with agency influence over
the presiding officer became a driving force behind the current movement toward central panels. 65 The central panel movement thus
addressed "concerns that an employee of a substantive agency could
not be trusted to render a fair and impartial decision in cases involving controversy between the agency and a citizen. '66 Today, more
59 Id. at 391-92.
60 Id. at 392.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 54, at 232 (arguing that any system in which
decisionmakers are embedded within the agency creates the potential for "pressure
on [decisionmakers] to produce decisions favorable to the agency").
65 See id. (stating the mission of a central panel is to combat the bias inherent in
the "old system" where the agency was "simultaneously the policeman, prosecutor,
judge, and jury of its own action").
66 See Hardwicke, supra note 53, at 422.
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than half of states have implemented the central panel design. 6 7 This
design removes the ALJ from the agency, and, consequently, the ALJ
is "freed from the risk of ex parte influence and bias in favor of the
agency and against the respondent." 68 Thus, the central panel ALJ
not only determines the outcome of the proceedings like a traditional
judge, but is also shielded from influence like a traditional judge. To
a certain extent, administrative adjudication carried out by an independent central panel mirrors the structure of traditional adjudication carried out by an independent judiciary. This further
undermines treating actions before administrative agencies as inherently distinct from those before courts and permitting removal only in
the latter case.
b.

Finality of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision

Treating the administrative law judge's decision as final is
another development which brings administrative adjudication closer
in line with traditional court proceedings. Until recently, nearly all
state administrative procedure acts permitted agencies "to amend the
ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law with relative ease." 69
Thus, in the past, the agency could exert its influence and effectively
overrule the ALJ's decision. Recently some states have made the ALJ's
decision final. 70 Some states have given the ALJ's decision final effect
via statute,7 1 others have provided for "de facto ALJ finality" by
restricting agency review of the decision. 72 De facto ALJ finality is
accomplished by placing substantial burdens on the agency should it
wish to modify or reject an ALJ's factual findings or conclusions of
law. 73 Through these methods, states have increasingly put control in
67 See id. at 420.
68 Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency:
Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposalfor Change, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 476
(2001).
69 James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State AdministrativeLaw Judge: Central
Panelsand Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1355, 1373 (2002).
70 Id. at 1374.
71 See id. at 1374-75. Professor Flanagan identifies two states that have enacted
statutes making the ALJ's decision final, Louisiana and South Carolina. See id. South
Carolina's system makes most cases which are heard by its central panel subject to a
final ALJ decision. See id. at 1375. Louisiana's system also features a central panel of
ALJs who issue "final orders, unreviewable by the agency." Id.
72 See id. at 1376-77.
73 Professor Flanagan's discussion of the modifications made to Florida's system
provides insight into this increased burden. See id. Florida has "strengthened the
protection accorded ALJ findings" by placing the burden on the agency to prove that
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the hands of the ALJ to make the final decision in an administrative
adjudication. With the AL charged to render the final disposition in
the case, administrative adjudication further parallels traditional judicial process.
The formalist methodology to agency removal draws a sharp distinction between state courts and state agencies. If the claim comes
before a court, removal is permissible. However, if the claim comes
before an agency, removal is not permissible.7 4 I have questioned
whether it makes sense to draw this distinction in light of the fact that
courts and agencies on the state level may handle indistinguishable
disputes. Policy choices and the plaintiffs discretion over the forum
explain how otherwise indistinguishable disputes may end up before
courts in some instances and before agencies in others. Moreover,
state courts and state agencies share a growing resemblance in their
institutional structuring. In many states ALJs have been placed in a
central panel, isolated from outside influence, and their decisions
have been accorded finality, paralleling structural features of the state
75
judiciary.
In sum, the developments sketched here suggest that modern
administrative adjudication has much in common with the traditional
judicial process, both in terms of the matters heard and adjudicatory
structure. Certainly, these developments do not render state agencies
courts in a formal sense, but they suggest that disallowing removal of
all actions commenced in agencies perhaps is not in line with the
increasingly 'judicial" character of state agencies. If state courts and
state agencies handle like disputes and are structured similarly, why
permit removal in the first case and deny in the latter? Such reasoning underlies the functional approach to agency removal, discussed
below.

the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law are incorrect. Id. The agency may
not unilaterally change a finding of fact or conclusion of law; to modify a factual
finding, the agency must show that the finding was not premised upon "'competent
substantial evidence"' and must state its reasoning "with particularity in [its] order"
modifying the ALJ decision. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)(1) (West
2000)). To modify an ALJ's conclusion of law, the agency must find that its interpretation of the law is "more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified" and
"must state with particularity its reasons for rejecting or modifying such conclusion of
law." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1) (1) (West 2008); see also Flanagan, supra note 69, at
1377 (discussing the agency's burden should it wish to modify an ALJ's conclusion of
law).
74 See supra Part 1.A.
75 See supra Part 1.B.1.
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THE FUNCTIONAL TEST: LOOKING TO THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE AGENCY

The formalist tack adopted by the Ninth Circuit is not the only
approach to agency removal. Perhaps in recognition of the increasingly 'judicial" character of state agencies, several courts have adopted
a functional approach to the question of whether removal from a state
administrative agency is proper. This Part examines the functional
approach to agency removal. It first lays out the functional tests
adopted the Seventh and First Circuits in Floeter v. C. W Transport,
Inc. 7 6 and Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations

Board.7 7 The remainder of this Part explores the conceptual and practical problems presented by using a functional approach to agency
removal.
A.

The FunctionalApproach: Examining the Agency

In stark contrast to the formalist approach to agency removal
examined in Part I is the functional approach. The formalist
approach attempts to draw a hard line between state courts and agen78
cies, permitting removal in the former instance, but not the later.
The functional approach, on the other hand, does not rely on such a
hard and fast distinction. Instead, the functional approach utilizes a
several-pronged inquiry to determine if the agency is sufficiently
court-like to warrant removal.
One oft-cited example of the functional approach is found in
Floeter v. C.W Transport, Inc. In Floeter, a group of truck drivers
claimed their employer had violated the terms of their collective bargaining agreement. 7 9 The employees took their complaint to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) ,80 a state
administrative body established under Wisconsin law to handle
employment disputes.8 1 The defendant-employer removed to the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.8 2 The district court
76 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
77 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972).
78 See supra Part I.A.
79 See Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1101.
80 See id.
81 See Wis. STAT. § 15.58 (2008) (providing for creation of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission); id. § 111.01 (4) ("It is the policy of the state, in order to
preserve and promote the interests of the public, the employee, and the employer
alike, to establish standards of fair conduct in employment relations and to provide a
convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which these interests may have
their respective rights and obligations adjudicated.").
82 Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1101.
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properly had federal question jurisdiction over the matter as it was an
"action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement."8 3 The sticking
point was whether WERC could be considered a state court for the
purposes of removal.8 4 In Floeter, the Seventh Circuit applied a twostep functional test, first evaluating the "functions, powers, and procedures" of the administrative body, and then considering the "respec85
tive state and federal interests . . . in the provision of a forum.'
Applying the two prongs of the functional test to WERC, the Seventh
Circuit found that the agency's procedures were "substantially similar
to those traditionally associated with the judicial process. 8' 6 Further,
the state's interest in providing a specialized tribunal to adjudicate
issues presented by labor disputes was "not substantially greater than
the state's interest in maintaining any court system" and did not "out87
weigh the defendant's right to remove the action to federal court.
The First Circuit has also adopted a functional approach to determine the propriety of removal from state administrative bodies. In
8 the
Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board"
court used the same factors used in Floeter-the functions, powers,
and procedures of the state agency and the respective state and federal interests-but also considered an additional factor, the "locus of
traditional jurisdiction"8 9 with respect to the kind of claim to be adjudicated by the agency. The "locus" factor considers whether the type
of claim presented before the agency is one which courts would typically hear. In other words, according to Volkswagen, a matter which
happens to fall within a court's jurisdiction favors removal. Thus, in
deciding whether the defendant could remove a dispute before the
Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board, the First Circuit found that "ordi83 Id. Federal question jurisdiction was founded upon 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
which provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ...
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction

(2006),
a labor
may be
of the

parties ......

84 See Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1101 ("The only question, then, is whether the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission was a 'state court' from which the action
could be removed.").
85 Id. at 1102.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972). In Volkswagen, the First Circuit initially considered
the issue of whether the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board was a court for the purposes of removal. Id. at 45. Determining the Board to be a court for the purposes of
removal then allowed the court to find that the Board had jurisdiction to adjudicate
the alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
89 Id. at 44.
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narily courts have adjudicated breaches of contract," such as collective
bargaining agreements. 90 Ultimately the proceeding was deemed
removable; the Floeter factors of the agency's powers and procedures
as well as the respective state and federal interests all pointed toward
permitting the defendant to have its day in federal court.9 '
B.

Flaws in the FunctionalMethodology

The functional approach carries with it several flaws and difficulties. One, its consideration of the agency's powers, functions, and
procedures is highly elastic and runs the risk of becoming an unprincipled analysis. Two, the test leaves unanswered questions regarding
how the agency should be analyzed and which prong of the test
should predominate. Three, it creates an opportunity for unequal
treatment of diversity and federal question cases even though such
disparate treatment is not sanctioned by the removal statute. I consider each of these concerns below.
1. Elasticity of the Functional Factors
The first part of the functional test used by the Floeter court considers the "functions, powers, and procedures" of the administrative
body. 9 2 This part of the test is designed to measure the "courtness" of
a particular administrative body; if the body sufficiently resembles a
court, it is considered a "State court" within the meaning of the
removal statute. However, the functions, powers, and procedures
prong is problematic in that it opens the door to an unconstrained
consideration of factors.
This critique becomes more apparent through a survey of the factors invoked by courts applying the functions, powers, and procedures
prong of the functional test. A whole host of factors have been considered relevant to an agency's "State courtness." Some factors appear
to be directly relevant to how judicial the administrative proceeding is.
For instance, courts have taken into consideration the scope of the
agency's enforcement power, examining such factors as: the ability of
90 Id.
91 See id. at 44-45. Regarding the agency's powers, the court held that the fact
that the proceeding was "inter partes"provided the necessary "threshold characteristic
of a 'civil action [brought] in a State court." Id. at 44 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1970)). As to the respective state and federal interests, the court found federal interests had clearly won out-prior cases had chipped away at the state's interest and the
substantive law to be applied was purely federal. See id. ("The state interest after
Lincoln Mills, Dowd Box, and Avco is indeed a limited one.").
92 See Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1102.
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the administrative body to "enforce subpoenas through a contempt
power";9 3 the fact that the administrative body must file a separate
action in a traditional court to enforce its decisions;9 4 and the fact that
the administrative body may only suspend the license of a party-it
may not provide "declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or monetary
damages."9 5
Beyond the agency's enforcement powers, courts have also taken
into account the nature of the procedures employed by the agency in
conducting the hearing. The pleadings paralleling those utilized in a
traditional court proceeding was a relevant factor in one agency
removal determination. 9 6 Other cases considered whether there were
discovery procedures and pre-hearing motions. 9 7 Courts have also
considered the parties' right to "present documentary evidence and
call witnesses," to "cross-examine adverse witnesses," and to "present
summation and argument" as relevant factors to guide the determination of whether an agency acts as a "State court" for the purposes of
removal. 98

Further, this prong of the functional test considers the qualifications and positioning of the decisionmaker in the proceeding. For
example, cases have taken into consideration the legal expertise of the
decisionmaker. 9 9 They have also looked to whether the decisionmaker is disinterested in the process and whether the decisionmaker is isolated from the executive branch.10 0
While these factors seem relevant to whether the agency is courtlike, many factors considered seem less probative of the agency's
"courtness." For instance, one agency removal determination took
into account the mileage paid to witnesses appearing before the
93 Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (D. Md. 2005).
94 Id.
95 Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d
673, 677 (D. Md. 2002).
96 Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep't, 170 F. Supp.
945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) ("The action is commenced by a complaint alleging the
violation of the contract, the person complained of has the right to file an answer,
and the [Wisconsin Employment Relations] Board sets the time for the hearing of the
complaint.").
97 Rockville, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
98 See id.
99 Compare McDowell v. Wetterau, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1995)
(finding decisionmaker showed "learnedness in the law" and permitting removal),
with BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284
(N.D. Fla. 2002) (finding decisionmakers lacked legal qualifications and remanding

to agency).
100

See McDowell, 910 F. Supp. at 238.
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agency and to witnesses appearing before a traditional court. 10' The
same level of reimbursement favored finding that the agency acted as
a state court for removal purposes.' 0 2 Another removal determination
0 3 Still
took into account whether the agency awarded attorneys' fees.'
another took into account whether the agency followed a generally
"adjudicative format,"10 4 a factor which seems too vague to hold much
value in distinguishing agencies that should be state courts for
removal purposes from those that should not.
Consideration of the agency's functions, powers, and procedures
invites the court to examine whatever factors it deems interesting in
an attempt to understand the nature of the agency and proceeding. It
is questionable whether any sort of principled determination of
whether the agency is a state court for removal purposes can be made
from such an inquiry. Where, precisely, the threshold lies remains a
mystery. Does "representation by counsel" plus "disinterested decisionmaker who has legal expertise" plus "awarding of attorneys' fees"
equal state court? What about "generally adjudicative format" plus
"enforcement powers"? There perhaps is no definite answer. Adding
enforcement powers into the mix also complicates the question as
there has been considerable disagreement over the probative value of
this particular factor; enforcement powers are key to whether the
agency operates as a "State court" in some cases, and in others the
0 5
agency's lack of enforcement powers is dismissed as insignificant.'
Thus the functional approach considers such a wide realm of factors that it leaves litigants with little certainty. It is not possible to
101 Tool & Die Makers, 170 F. Supp. at 950.
102 See id.
103 Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1063,
1068 (C.D. Ill. 1999), rev'd, 224 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2000).
104 Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.
1972); see also Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F. 2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (relying on the fact that the procedures used by the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission are "substantially similar to those traditionally associated with
the judicial process" without further consideration of what those procedures are).
105 Compare Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (D.
Md. 2005) (finding that the Maryland Insurance Administration's lack of enforcement powers counseled against treating it as a court for purposes of removal), and
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284 (N.D.
Fla. 2002) (finding that the Florida Public Service Commission's lack of enforcement
powers counseled against treating it as a court for removal purposes), with Volkswagen,
454 F.2d at 44 (finding that the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board functions as a
state court for removal purposes despite the fact that it lacks enforcement powers),
and Floeter, 597 F.2d at 1102 (finding that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission functions as a state court for removal purposes despite lacking enforcement
powers).
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predict with reasonable accuracy whether a district court faced with an
agency removal question will keep the case or remand it. This lack of
predictability may give rise to "substantial mischief," in the words of
the BellSouth court:
To the extent possible, removability should be governed by clear
rules, so that improper removals (with their attendant delay and
interference with state proceedings) may be minimized. An
approach that made removability turn on a federal court's after-thefact, case-by-case analysis of whether an administrative agency would
be acting in the same manner as a court in resolving a particular
dispute would have the capacity to create substantial mischief in the
administrative arena, by encouraging parties to take a shot at
removal, with inevitable delays and disruptions. Given the number
and variety of administrative proceedings that take place .

.

. on a

daily basis-many involving out-of-state respondents-this is a mat10 6
ter of no small moment.
And the BellSouth court is far from alone on the point. Many
have commented on the potential for mischief in the removal process. 10 7 If functional factors become the touchstone for agency
removal determinations, hundreds of removal notices may lie ahead,
108
potentially wreaking havoc on the federal judiciary.
By way of summary, the functional approach includes a consideration of the functions, powers, and procedures of the administrative
body where the action was commenced. This consideration of functional factors is highly elastic, and leaves room for courts to consider
practically any aspect of the agency in deciding whether it is sufficiently court-like to warrant removal. The elasticity of the functional
106 BellSouth, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
107 See, e.g., Haiber, supra note 12, at 610 (asserting that removal is ripe for
gamemanship).
108 The BellSouth court was certainly of the opinion that functional determinations
of whether removal of a particular dispute from an agency was warranted had the
potential to flood the federal courts:
Many [administrative] proceedings involve a governmental entity, not
merely private parties. [Because states are] not ... citizen [s] of any state for
diversity purposes[,] administrative proceedings initiated by the state and
not arising under federal law would create no issue of removability. But cities and many other governmental entities are citizens of the state for diversity
purposes. If the proceeding at issue here were held removable based on a
case-specific analysis of the nature of the function the agency would perform
to resolve the matter, then the number of other administrative proceedings
that also would be rendered removable-or at least would create an arguable issue sufficient to allow removal and require a case-specific determination of a motion to remand-would be significant.
See BellSouth, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 n.2.
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factors results in uncertainty as to whether removal from an agency
will be warranted, and this uncertainty in turn invites scheming
defendants to take their chances and file notices of removal. Enter a
dark cloud of swirling removal notices closing in on the federal judiciary-or at least, so the critique would go.
2.

Unresolved Difficulties

But for now, let us leave behind the notion of district courts
papered over with the removal notices from enterprising defendants
facing adjudication in a state agency. Assume that it would be possible
to constrain the realm of possible factors that determine an agency's
"State courtness" such that a flooding of the federal courts would not
pose a problem. Still, other conceptual problems with the functional
test would remain unresolved. Below I examine two such problems:
one, whether the inquiry should focus on the agency as a whole or the
particular dispute; and two, as the functional approach is a multi-pronged inquiry, which prong should hold the most weight in the
removal determination.
a.

The Dispute-Specific and Global Approaches

The functional approach leaves many problems unresolved. For
instance, should the functional approach look only to the agency's
handling of the particular proceeding which the defendant seeks to
remove? Under a "dispute-specific" approach, removal would be permitted if the agency handled the particular dispute in a court-like way.
Or, should the functional approach broaden its focus and take a
"global view" of the agency's operations? Under this view, removal is
permitted if and only if the entirety of the agency's functions are courtlike. The functional tests of Foeter and Volkswagen have spawned cases
which take both the global and dispute-specific views. 10 9
109 Floeter and Volkswagen themselves would arguably be "dispute-specific" cases.
Both look to the way the agency will handle the current dispute. In Floeter, the court
emphasized that its holding is limited to the particular facts of the case. See Floeter,
597 F.2d at 1102 ("Other actions brought before the agency may involve different
state and federal interests, or a different agency role, and a weighing of the competing
interests in those cases might well result in a determination that those cases cannot be
properly removed." (emphasis added)). Similarly, in Volkswagen the court's holding
that removal from the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board is proper appears to be
limited to the particular type of dispute. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 45 ("[W]e conclude
that the Board in conducting unfair labor practice proceedings for breach of collective bargaining agreements under § 301 acts as a court and that such proceedings are
removable to federal court." (emphasis added)).
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One such example in the dispute-specific realm is Southaven
Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp.11 0 The case involved a dispute
between Southaven, a Yamaha dealership, and the Yamaha Motor
Corp., stemming from allegations that Yamaha had not supplied
Southaven with sufficient inventory to meet consumer demand and
had entered into a dealership agreement with a another dealer just a
few miles away from Southaven.' 1 The dealership initially lodged its
complaint with the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission
(MMVC). 11 2 Yamaha removed to the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, which promptly remanded to the MMVC. 113
Citing Floeterand Volkswagen, the court found that "even if there might
be instances in which the MMVC might be deemed a 'state court'...
this is not one of them."'1 14 The fact that the court looked to instances
of the MMVC's functioning properly places this case in the disputespecific realm.
Some Floeter-Volkswagen progeny have come to the opposite conclusion-that the functional test should focus on the entirety of the
agency's functions, powers, and procedures rather than the nature of
the particular dispute being adjudicated by the agency. BellSouth Tele11 5
communications, Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc. is one such example.
Defendant Vartec asserted that the court should not focus on the
"usual or dominant functions in the many matters [the Florida Public
For an overview of cases dealing with removal from state agencies and naming
Floeter and Volkswagen as illustrative of 'Jurisdictions that apply the functional test but
only look at the way the agency will handle the current dispute" see Johnston, supra
note 14, at 451. Johnston subdivides courts applying functional tests into three discrete groups. Id. The first group applies the functional test focusing on the "way the
agency will handle the current dispute." Id. (emphasis added). The second group
applies the functional test with an eye to the "overall purpose of the agency." Id.
(emphasis added). The third group applies the functional test, but puts "more
emphasis on the state and federal interest than on the agency's function." Id.
110 128 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Miss. 2000). Kawasaki can properly be treated as
progeny of Floeter and Volkswagen as it cites and relies on both cases. See id. at 981.
111 Id. at 976.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 982.
114 Id.
115 Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994), might be
another such example. The Sun Buick court considered removal from the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles. See id. at 1261. The court left open the question of
"whether removal under section 1441 (a) from an administrative agency is ever permissible in an exceptional case, because it [was] clear that the Pennsylvania Board of
Vehicles would not qualify under any circumstances." Id. at 1264. The fact that the
court determined that the Board of Vehicles would not qualify in any instance suggests it was looking to the whole of the agency's functioning.
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Service Commission] addresses, but instead solely on how it would
16
function in resolving the specific dispute at issue in the case at bar."'
The court rejected the dispute-specific approach out of hand, concluding that "the issue is not just how the Florida Public Service Commission would act in resolving [the] particular dispute." 1 7 Rather,
the relevant issue was how the Commission generally functions. 1 8
The court ultimately found that "[d]ay in and day out, the Commission functions as an administrative agency, not as a court."1 1 9 Thus,
the functional approach has left open the question of whether the
analysis should center on the agency itself or on the proceeding.
b.

Relative Weight of the Functional Test's Prongs

Whether the analysis should be global or dispute-specific is not
the only question the functional test has left unresolved. The relative
weight of each of the functional test's prongs is also an open question.
There is dissensus among courts as to which prong of the test predominates in the inquiry. Several cases state that the evaluation of the
state and federal interests at play is more important than other aspects
of the test. Rockville calls the state-federal interest prong the "'more
21
critical inquiry."120 Ginn v. North CarolinaDepartment of Corrections
came to the same conclusion, calling the state-federal interest prong
the "more important test for removability.' 22 Wirtz also arguably fits
in this category, 123 and there are additional cases which suggest that
116 BellSouth v. Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280,
1282 (N.D. Fla. 2002).
117 Id. at 1283. The court rejected the dispute-specific approach for two reasons.
One, it drained any separate meaning out of the removal statute's requirement that
the dispute come from a "State court," given that the statute also has an independent
requirement that the dispute be a "civil action." See id. at 1282-83. Two, practical
difficulties abound with the dispute-specific approach. An "after-the-fact, case-by-case
analysis of whether an administrative agency would be acting in the same manner as a
court ... would have the capacity to create substantial mischief in the administrative
arena, by encouraging parties to take a shot at removal, with inevitable delays and
disruptions." Id. at 1283.
118 See id.

119

Id.

120 Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d
673, 679 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. McCullion, Nos. C2-87-1459, C288-142, 1989 WL 267215, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1989)).
121 829 F. Supp. 804 (E.D.N.C. 1993).

122

Id. at 806.

123 See Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc., 224 F.3d 708, 713
(7th Cir. 2000). Wirtz's discussion of Hoetermakes this point clear. See id. Wirtzdistinguishes Floeter (which found removal from an administrative agency proper, see
Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)) not
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the state-federal interest prong predominates.1 24 Meanwhile, other
cases use a more even-handed approach to the various prongs. 125 At
the opposite end of the spectrum are cases which do not enter into
the state-federal interests inquiry at all, instead relying solely on the
functions, powers, and procedures prong. 126 Thus, there is not a uniform approach as to which of the functional test's prongs should
predominate in the inquiry. In some cases, whether an agency is a
state court from which removal is proper has been determined by
state and federal interests; in other cases it was determined by the
agency's functions, powers, and procedures.
The functional approach is an untidy one. There is a lack of uniformity in the manner the test is applied. In some cases, the functions, powers, and procedures prong is applied with an eye to the
specific dispute which is to be removed. In others, the functions, powers, and procedures prong focuses not on the dispute to be removed,
but rather on the agency as a whole. Additionally, the functional
approach leaves unresolved the relative weight of the functions, powers, and procedures prong as to the state-federal interests prong.

on the basis that the agency's functions, powers, and procedures are any less "courtlike," but rather because the "weighing of the competing [state and federal] interests
results in a different conclusion not sanctioning removal to federal court." See Wirtz,
224 F.3d at 713. Thus, the state-federal interest prong predominated, as the Court
reasoned that even if two agencies are functionally indistinguishable, the state and
federal interests may operate to make removal possible from one agency, but not the
other. Additionally, Judge Ripple wrote separately in Wirtz to emphasize that the propriety of removal should have turned on the agency's functions, powers, and procedures, which hints that under the majority's analysis, removal turned on the
respective state-federal interests. See id. at 714 (Ripple, J., concurring).
124 See Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Md.
2005) ("[C]onsideration of the respective state and federal interests also supports
remand. This second component of the functional test has been called the 'more
critical inquiry."' (quoting Rockville, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 679)); Ford Motor Co. v.
McCullion, Nos. C2-87-1459, C2-88-142, 1989 WL 267215, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14,
1989) ("The second and more critical inquiry centers upon the respective federal and
state interests implicated in the controversy."); see also Johnston, supra note 14, at
451-52 (identifying jurisdictions which "put more emphasis on the state and federal
interest than on the agency's function").
125 See Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 43-45
(1st Cir. 1972) (relying on functions, procedures, and powers of the agency, the locus
of traditional jurisdiction, and the respective state and federal interests).
126 See, e.g., McDowell v. Wetterau, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1995)
(considering only functions, powers, and procedures).
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Diversity Jurisdiction: The Functional Test's "Back Door Bias"

Finally, the functional test is problematic in that it favors removal
of federal question cases over diversity cases. This unequal treatment
of federal question and diversity cases is problematic because it is not
sanctioned by the removal statute in its current form. While varying
treatment of federal question and diversity cases would have been permissible under prior versions of the removal statute, such varying
treatment is not permitted under the current statute. Thus, the functional test, by treating federal question and diversity cases unequally,
lets a bias in the back door.
Historically, the federal removal statute left the door open to disparate treatment of federal question and diversity cases. In the
removal statute enacted in 1911,127 federal question cases were removable without a further showing (essentially as they are today128 ),
whereas diversity cases required additional showings, giving the court
considerably more discretion to remand diversity cases. The 1911
enactment made diversity removal subject to two requirements. One,
the defendant could not be a resident of the state where the suit was
brought (same as removal today).129 Two, the defendant was required
to present affirmative proof that "prejudice or local influence" would
prevent him from obtaining justice in the state court where the action
was commenced. 13 0 The case would be subject to remand if the district court determined that the "suit [could] be fully and justly determined . . . without being affected by such prejudice
31
influence.1

or local

This second requirement would justify treating federal question
and diversity cases differently because, in the latter instance, the district court is permitted to consider in a practical manner whether the
state court would provide a fair adjudication to the defendant.
127 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)).
128 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
129 § 28, 36 Stat. at 1094.
130 Id. at 1094-95. Removal on grounds of diversity jurisdiction was only permitted when it was "made to appear to [the] district court that from prejudice or local
influence [the defendant] will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, or in
any other State court to which the said defendant may, under the laws of the State,
have the right ...to remove said cause." Id. at 1095 (emphasis added). The affirmative proof was an affidavit demonstrating that the defendant will not be able to obtain
a fair adjudication in the state forum. See id.
131 Id. The district court is directed to "examine into the truth of [the defendant's] affidavit and the grounds thereof, and, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction
of said court that [the defendant] will not be able to obtain justice in said State court,
it shall cause the same to be remanded thereto." See id.
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Indeed, under prior enactments of the removal statute, courts did
inquire whether there was genuine local bias to support a petition for
removal on the basis of diversity, 132 and cases were remanded for failure to show the requisite local prejudice.1 33 Therefore, prior enactments justified different results in "removal success" between federal
question and diversity cases because a case presenting a question of
diversity removal was subject to the district court's discretion regarding the ability of the defendant to obtain a fair adjudication in the
134
state court where the action was commenced.
The current federal removal statute does not provide a basis for
vastly differing treatment. Under § 1441 (a), cases premised on either
diversity and federal question jurisdiction are removable. 13 5 Section
1441 (b) provides additional limitations. 136 A diversity case is removable provided that the defendant is not a citizen of the state where the
action was brought. 137 Federal question cases are removable without
regard to the parties' citizenship. 138 Thus, removability requires that
the district court be able to exercise some brand of original jurisdiction, either federal question or diversity,' 39 and in the case of diversity, there is an additional hurdle in that the defendant cannot be a
citizen where the suit was brought. However, this additional hurdle
does not afford the district court much discretion-either the defen132 See P. Schwenk & Co. v. Strang, 59 F. 209, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1893) (considering
removal under the 1887 enactment). In Strang, removal was inappropriate because
the in the affidavit "[n]ot a fact [was] stated, from which prejudice or local influence
could be inferred." See id. at 209. Courts took seriously the duty to examine whether
there was a factual basis supporting the existence of bias. See Ellison v. Louisville &
N.R. Co., 112 F. 805, 809 (6th Cir. 1902) ("Unless the exercise of the duty devolved
upon the court is perfunctory merely, it necessarily involves the agitation of the question of the existence of facts which will prevent a fair and impartial trial in the state courts.
However delicate this duty may be, it is one that may not be avoided, but must be
discharged to the full measure of the obligation imposed." (emphasis added)); see also
Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U.S. 459, 468 (1892),superseded by statute,Act of'June 25, 1948, Ch.
646, 62 Stat. 939 ("[T]he prejudice or local influence must be made to appear to the
Circuit Court, that is, the Circuit Court must be legally satisfied, by proof suitable to the
nature of the case, of the truth of the allegation that, by reason of those causes, the
defendant will not be able to obtain justice in the state courts

....

"

(emphasis

added)).
133 See Strang, 59 F. at 211 (remanding to state court as defendant's affidavit only
stated the conclusion that there was local prejudice).
134 See § 28, 36 Stat. at 1095.
135 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
136 See id.§ 1441(b).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Or, of course, any other brand of original jurisdiction.
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dant is (or is not) a citizen of the state where the action was
commenced.
Thus, the federal removal statute in its current form only calls for
consideration of the type of jurisdiction at one juncture, in the measuring of citizenship of the defendant. (One minor exception might
be for the one-year time bar which applies to diversity cases). 140 After
that point, whether original jurisdiction is based on a federal question
or diversity of citizenship does not play a role in the removal calculus.
The general removal right is phrased in jurisdiction-blind terms,
applying to "any civil action brought in a State court of which the
14 1
district courts of the United States have originaljurisdiction.'
Contrast this premise with the functional approach to removal
from agencies. Under the functional approach the type of jurisdiction does make a difference in the removal calculus. By considering
the respective federal and state interests in the provision of a forum,
the functional test helps removal of federal question cases while hindering removal of diversity cases. In a federal question case, there will
naturally be strong federal interests, as the claim calls for application
of federal law, whereas with a diversity case, the state will likely have
strong interests since the dispute will naturally center upon application of its administrative law. Thus, the fact that the defendant is
involved in a diversity case weighs against removal despite the fact that
the statutory text provides for a removal right largely independent of
the species of original jurisdiction which the district court would have
exercised.
This unequal treatment of federal question and diversity cases is
evident in jurisdictions which apply the functional test. The existence
of a federal question weighs heavily toward removal from the agency
whereas the "mere" existence of diversity jurisdiction gives way to the
state interests in establishing a coherent policy to be carried out by its
administrative body. Both Floeter and Volkswagen show how the existence of a federal question tips the scales in favor of allowing removal.
loeter involved a collective bargaining dispute governed by federal
law. 142 Because a federal question was presented, state interests in
"providing a 'convenient and expeditious tribunal to adjudicate the
rights and interests of parties to a labor dispute"' were overshad140 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
141 Id. § 1441(a) (emphasis added).
142 See Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) ("The complaint filed with the WERC was basically a breach of contract... ;
it could have been brought in either state or federal court as alternative forums, but
would have been determined by federal law. .. ").
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Similarly, in Volkswagen, where the substantive law to be

applied was "purely federal,"1 44 the existence of a federal question
outweighed the state's interest in utilizing the "specialized expertise of
its Board or in [its] expedited procedures."' 14 5 Floeter and Volkswagen,
then, reveal the ease with which a federal question case "passes" the
federal-state interest inquiry.
Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners North America, Inc.146 provides the corollary to Floeterand Volkswagen-diversityjurisdiction hinders the administrative body from passing the federal-state interest
inquiry. The case originated in the Illinois Liquor Control Commission (ILCC), 147 an agency empowered to license liquor retailers and
handle certain kinds of disputes among retailers. The defendant
sought to remove on the basis of diversity.' 48 Regarding the federal
and state interests at play, the court baldly states that the "diversity
jurisdiction process is outweighed by the state's interest in administering its own alcoholic beverages program.' 1

49

The statutory text does

not sanction such weighing of the kind of jurisdiction versus against
any other kind of interest-the statute in effect says, once a showing
has been made that there is original jurisdiction of any kind the defendant's removal right is only premised on there being a "civil action
brought in a State court."1 50 Sneaking a bias against the defendant's
removal right premised on the kind of jurisdiction to be exercised by
the district court back into the calculus as a part of the determination
15 1
of what is a state court is altogether inconsistent with the statute.
Wirtz exemplifies how the functional test permits a bias against diver143 Id. (quoting Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 262 N.W.2d 218, 226 (Wis. 1978)).
144 Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.
1972).
145

Id. at 45.

146 224 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2000).
147 Id. at 709-10.
148 See id. at 710 ("In this present case there is diversity under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) .... The issue quickly becomes whether or not the [state agency] qualifies
as a court for removal purposes.")
149 Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
150 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). As previously discussed, in the case of diversity
jurisdiction, a showing that the defendant is a nonresident is also required. See id.
§ 1441(b). Still, however, it is hardly arguable that this requirement sanctions weigh-

ing of the type of jurisdiction against other interests such that diversity removal from
administrative agencies becomes more difficult.
151 Interestingly, Wirtz makes its anti-diversity bent even clearer by citing a report
prepared by the judicial branch which advocates that Congress should take steps to
reduce the "number of federal court proceedings in which jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship." See Wirtz, 224 F.3d at 713 n.3 (quotingJUDICIAL CONFERENCE
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sity in the "back door," where the statutory language calls for no such
152
prejudice.
Moreover, Wirtz is far from an isolated incident. 153 Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. 154 provides an additional
example of the diversity bias phenomenon. 15 5 Rockville involved a
dealership's claim that Harley-Davidson's distribution practices violated state law. In Rockville, removal was not permitted from the
Motor Vehicles Administration, a unit within the Maryland Department of Transportation, because diversity jurisdiction was not
adjudged to be a sufficient federal interest: "The sole federal interest
at stake ... is in providing a forum to diverse parties. Such an interest
is inadequate in light of the state's substantial interest in administering a state program and preserving the oversight role of a state
56
agency."1
Thus, cases like Wirtz and Rockville demonstrate a complication
implicit in application of the functional approach. It causes disparate
U.S., THE LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 29-30 (1995), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CHO4.PDF).
152 My goal here is not to question the propriety of a plan to reduce the number
of diversity cases, but rather to question its unseemly implementation in the context
of removal, which does not provide for a wholly qualified removal right in the case of
diversity jurisdiction.
OF THE

153 Research uncovers no diversity case begun in administrative agency removed
successfully. See also infta note 155 (citing cases that exhibit the bias against diversity
jurisdiction in the context of removal from agencies).
154 217 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D. Md. 2002).
155 There are other cases exhibiting the diversity bias phenomenon. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2005). Gottlieb found
removal from the Maryland Insurance Administration improper where "[n]o issue of
federal law [was] involved"; ultimately, the "federal interest at stake in [the] dispute .... providing a forum to diverse parties, [was] 'inadequate in light of the state's
substantial interest in administering a state program and preserving the oversight role
of a state agency."' Id. at 582 (quoting Rockville, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 680). Southaven
Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp. arguably provides a further example, though
the court's very limited discussion of the state and federal interests at play make it
difficult to tell. See 128 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982 (S.D. Miss. 2000). The court found that
its interest in adjudicating the dispute was not greater that the interest held by the
Mississippi Motor Vehicles Board. See id. It is unclear what the court's interest wasthe court did not say that its interest in adjudicating the dispute was to provide a
forum to diverse parties, but that may well be the implication.
156 Rockville, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 680. Moreover, the Rockville court's recital of the
functional test also elucidates the test's underlying bias against diversity jurisdiction:
"The federal court should assume jurisdiction only if the agency functions as a court
and federal interests predominate over state interests." Id. at 676 (emphasis added). As
previously stated, federal interests naturally predominate in a federal question casebut do not in a diversity jurisdiction case.
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treatment of federal question cases and diversity cases-federal question cases are favored in the state-federal interests prong of the
inquiry while diversity cases are disfavored. This varying treatment
allows a bias into the removal calculus that is not sanctioned by the
statutory text.
III.

TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO REMOVAL FROM
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Neither of the current approaches provides a satisfactory resolu-

tion to the problem of whether proceedings may be removed from
state administrative bodies. The formalist treatment of agency
removal is dissatisfying in its refusal to consider the "true nature" of
the agency-no matter how closely the agency parallels a traditional
court in terms of its functioning and the matters it hears, removal will
not be permitted. 15 7 As the Volkswagen court pointed out, considering
functional factors is "far more satisfactory than to be content with a
158
Steinian rendering of 'a board is a board is a board."'
Considering functional factors may be more satisfactory, but the
functional approach remains far from perfect. As Oregon Bureau
points out,

59

language. 160

the functional approach is removed from the statutory

Thus, in many cases it leads to removal determinations
which are hard to square with the statutory text itself. For instance,
the functional approach's consideration of the respective state and
federal interests opens the door to disparate treatment of diversity
and federal question cases in a way which is not contemplated by the
removal statute.1 6 I Furthermore, the functional test's consideration
of the agency's functions, powers, and procedures risks becoming an
unprincipled analysis, 62 and the functional approach is undeveloped
157

See supra Part I.B.

158 Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.
1972).
159 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
160 See also Johnson v. Albertson's LLC, No. 3:08cv236, 2008 WL 3286988, at *1
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2008) ("There is nothing in the text of § 1441 which suggests that
Congress intended to authorize the removal of cases from state administrative agencies to federal court under the statute, even where the agency performs ordinary judicial functions."); Civil Rights Div. v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 08-60493-CIV,
2008 WL 2616154, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2008) ("[T]he functional view goes beyond
the language of Section 1441 ... .
161 See supra Part II.B.3.
162 See supra Part II.B.1.
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in some senses as the proper mechanics of its application remain
unresolved.

63

My contention is simple: there must be a better way. Below, I
outline an alternative approach to the current formalist and functional tests. I contend that removal, generally, can be seen as a mechanism which preserves the essential role of the federal courts. It
supplies a link between the federal courts and those cases which fall
within the original jurisdiction of the district courts. The test for
agency removal must take this into account-its goal should be to prevent a complete disconnect between the federal courts and "federal"
cases when state legislatures elect to delegate jurisdiction to agencies.
The inquiry developed in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor is of use. While this inquiry was originally developed with congressional delegations to non-Article III adjudicators in mind, it can
be adapted to the agency removal context. I conclude that modifying
the Schor inquiry supplies a better approach to agency removal; it balances the competing concerns at play and resolves some of the
problems presented by the other tests.
Removal as Preserving the Role of the Federal Courts

A.

In handling the agency removal question, courts should draw
inferences from the role removal is meant to play. The role of
removal is often discussed in terms of fairness to defendants; removal
jurisdiction is said to embody the "belief that both the plaintiff and
the defendant should have the opportunity to benefit from the availability of a federal forum." 164 While explaining removal in terms of
fairness to defendants is undoubtedly correct, it is more helpful in this
context to couch removal in terms of its role in preserving the structural facets of our tripartite government. At its core, removal provides
a "mechanism for transferring to federal court those cases in which
both the Constitution and Congress have authorized original federal
jurisdiction."1

65

Removal jurisdiction can be seen as preserving the

essential role of the federal courts. It assures a link between the federal courts and their domain, cases falling within Article III's jurisdictional heads, even if those cases happen to originate in state courts.
Simply put, removal jurisdiction allows the federal court system to
carry out the purposes behind its jurisdictional grants. For instance,
with federal question jurisdiction, the removal "link" allows the federal court to guard "against state hostility to federal law or interests,"
See supra Part II.B.2.

163
164

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDIC'FION §

165

See Haiber, supra note 12, at 611.

5.5, at 354 (5th ed. 2007).
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to take advantage of its own expertise in federal law matters, and to
develop "uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal
law."'16 6 The same can be said for diversity jurisdiction-removal permits federal courts to carry out the purpose behind the jurisdictional
grant. In a diversity suit where the plaintiff has commenced the
action in his home state court, "removal by the defendant to a federal
court effectuates a primary purpose of diversity jurisdiction in providing a seemingly more neutral forum. '1 67 Thus, removal jurisdiction
can be seen as preserving the essential role of the federal courts.
If the goal of removal jurisdiction more generally is to preserve
the essential role of the federal courts, this same goal should inform
the approach to removal from state agencies. However, preserving
the essential role of the federal courts is not an easy task in the context of agency removal. Any allocation of jurisdiction must be done
with an eye to both separations of powers concerns and federalism
concerns as state agencies and the federal courts are stratified both
horizontally and vertically. Separation of powers provides a horizontal
division between state agencies and federal courts, and federalism
supplies a vertical division. Here I seek a test that will take into
account both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of agency
removal in order to preserve the role of the federal courts. For a
moment, however, I will set aside federalism concerns and focus solely
on separation of powers principles.
B.

Preserving the Federal Courts through the Schor Inquiry

The Supreme Court has before faced the issue of what must stay
the province of Article III courts, and what may be constitutionally
delegated to non-Article III tribunals at Congress' election. 168 The
Court has "declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules" with
regard to sorting out the separation of powers concerns presented
when Congress lodges jurisdiction outside of the federal judiciary.169
166 See John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 145, 180 (2006).
167 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 164, at 354-55.
168 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986) (considering constitutionality of an administrative agency empowered to hear

certain state law counterclaims); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982) (considering constitutionality of an act utilizing the bankruptcy courts as adjuncts to Article III courts); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45-49
(1932) (considering constitutionality of an administrative agency empowered to

determine maritime employee compensation claims).
169 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
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Instead, in Schor, the Court settled upon a functional analysis. 170 This
functional analysis considers four factors, namely:
[T] he extent to which the "essential attributes ofjudicial power" are
reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which

the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111.171
Through these four factors, the Schor inquiry resolves the separation of powers concerns at play when Congress vests adjudicatory
power outside of the judiciary. In simple terms, Schor balancing either
endorses or bars a particular delegation ofjudicial authority to a nonjudicial entity. In essence, if the delegation impermissibly "threatens
the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch," it will be barred
under the Schor inquiry.1 72 Conversely, if the delegation does not
threaten the institutional integrity of the judiciary, then the Schor
inquiry will endorse it. Thus, the inquiry seeks to preserve the essential role of the federal courts, preventing excessive delegation of judicial functions to other branches.
The inquiry was developed, of course, with primarily horizontal
separation of powers principles in mind. 173 Schor examined Congress'
delegation of adjudicatory authority to the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission. 174 Schor, a litigant who had proceeded before
the Commission, contended that the Commission, a legislatively created entity, could not exercise jurisdiction over certain state law counI 75
terclaims-they were the province of the federal judiciary alone.
The inquiry, thus, is founded upon concerns regarding allocation of
power among the branches of the federal government. It attempts to
prevent too much "sideways" vesting of federal judicial power in other
branches of the federal government.
Even though the Schor inquiry was developed with mostly horizontal concerns in mind, it also has potential for application to the
agency removal question, which features both horizontal separation of
powers and vertical federalism dimensions. The Schor inquiry and
removal align in their aim to preserve the essential function of the
170

See id.

171

Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585

(1985)).
172 See id. at 851.
173 See id. at 850-51 (introducing the inquiry with a discussion of the structural
principles underlying Article III).

174
175

See id. at 855-56.
See id. at 853.
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federal judiciary. Schor seeks to protect the essential function of the
federal judiciary against excessive delegation by the national legislative power. Removal, too, can be seen as protecting the essential function of the judiciary. As noted above, removal permits federal courts
to take cognizance over claims falling within its jurisdiction, as authorized by the Constitution and Congress, even though those claims are
brought initially before state courts. Thus, Schor preserves the federal
judiciary's role vis-,A-vis the national legislature and removal preserves
the federal judiciary's role vis-d-vis the states.
Before proceeding to explain how Schor can be applied to solve
the agency removal problem, I wish to underscore one distinction
which illustrates why the Schor inquiry makes particular sense in the
context of agency removal. Removal jurisdiction, as a general proposition, provides a link between the federal judiciary and state courts.
Because of this link, a defendant may shift a case cognizable under a
federal district court's original jurisdiction from state court to federal
court. Thus, removal jurisdiction is in effect a "check" on the concurrent jurisdiction exercised by the state courts, ensuring federal courts
may play a role in adjudicating "federal" claims.
Removal jurisdiction should also operate as a "check" against
state agencies when they are exercising jurisdiction over claims which
fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. If removal
jurisdiction does not operate as a "check" against state agencies handling "federal" claims, then a state has carte blanche to shift jurisdiction of any and every claim to an agency. 176 Once the claims are
before state agencies, removal provides no link back to the federal
court system. Thus a state legislature's decision to shift adjudication
of the bulk of claims to state agencies would cut off the federal courts
from those claims completely. There is, therefore, special potential
for enterprising states to chip away at the core role of the federal judiciary, without removal as "recourse." The Schor inquiry is responsive
to this concern. It recognizes that separation of powers principles
protect the essential role of the federal courts, and it prevents excessive delegations of judicial power.
While the Schor inquiry readily handles horizontal separation of
powers concerns, ensuring that excessive federal legislative delegations of judicial power do not infringe upon the core role of the federal judiciary, it must be adapted to function in the state agency
removal context. Adaptation is necessary because the agency removal
176 Provided, of course, the state legislature conforms to any requirements of its
own Constitution with regard to delegation of judicial authority to nonjudicial
entities.
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problem concerns allocation of judicial power not only horizontally,
among the branches of government, but vertically, among the state
and federal systems. In particular, three significant adaptations are
required. One, the "subject" of the inquiry must be changed from a
delegation by Congress to one by a state legislature. Two, the "effect"
of the inquiry must be changed. In the agency removal context, the
goal is not to strike down excessive state delegations of judicial power,
but to allow removal to federal court in the case of excessive delegation. Lastly, one of the original inquiry's factors, "the extent to which
the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III
courts" 177 will not apply. These adaptations are explained more fully

below.
In its original context, Schor balancing refers to whether Congress
can delegate certain adjudicatory power outside the federal judiciaryas stated, either endorsing or barring those delegations. By contrast,
in the agency removal context, a Schor-like inquiry will operate not
upon congressional delegations, but on a state legislature's delegations
of adjudicatory power outside the statejudiciary. Thus, adapting Schor
to the agency removal context, the state legislature's delegation of
adjudicatory authority to a state administrative agency becomes the
relevant delegation to be tested.
Beyond changing the "subject" of the Schor inquiry, an additional
adaption is required. In its original context, Schor either endorses or
bars congressional delegations of judicial power to non-Article III
courts. If the delegation fails the Schor inquiry, it is struck down as
unconstitutional: Congress may not effect such a delegation. However,
in the agency removal context, the effect of the balancing is not to
strike down a state's excessive delegation of judicial power to an
agency. If excessive delegation is found under the Schor framework,
the conclusion is that the action before the state agency is removable
(provided, of course, that the case is cognizable under a federal
court's original jurisdiction). Therefore the inquiry has no effect on
the state's ability to vest jurisdiction where it deems appropriate, in
either agencies or courts. The inquiry merely provides that if the state
legislature's delegation of "federal" cases to state agencies is excessive,
removal from those agencies will be permitted.
Lastly, the Schor test, in its original form, includes considering the
"extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are
reserved to Article III courts" within the context of a congressional
177 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473
U.S. 568, 585 (1985)).
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delegation of jurisdiction to a non-Article III entity.' 78 Stated more
concretely, the factor measures the "level of judicial review retained
over . . . decisions" made by the non-Article III adjudicator, for

instance a federal administrative law judge, magistrate, or bankruptcy
judge. 179 If sufficient review is retained in Article III courts, the delegation poses no threat to essential functions of the judiciary.
This factor, while certainly informative in the context of congressional delegations of judicial power outside of Article III, is not very
helpful in the context of agency removal. State agencies do not
occupy a similar role to the federal "adjuncts" which are typically the
subjects of the Schor inquiry. 180 With these federal "adjuncts," there is
frequently review as of right in an Article III court. 181 With a state
agency, however, there is no such review as of right in an Article III
court. So, for the purposes of the agency removal problem, this
inquiry is largely a static one. The result will always be: when a state
agency is exercising jurisdiction over "federal" cases, a role for the
federal judiciary has not been reserved by the delegation. Thus, in the
context of agency removal, this first factor acts not as a true part of the
inquiry, but a backdrop consideration. It is a reminder that a state's
choice to lodge jurisdiction over "federal" cases in an agency isolates
these cases from the federal judiciary.
C. Applying the Modified Schor Inquiry
Now having demonstrated the modifications required to adapt
Schor to the agency removal problem, below I proceed to illustrate in
more detail how the modified Schor inquiry would be applied.
1. Limited Jurisdiction Assigned to Administrative Agency
This factor measures the "breadth" of jurisdiction granted to the
administrative agency. If the agency exercises jurisdiction only over a
"'particularized area of law,"' 182 this weighs for nonremovability.
Conversely, if the agency is granted a broad swath of jurisdiction,
178
179

Id.
Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 1999).

180

See, e.g., id. (utilizing the Schor inquiry to determine the constitutionality of

delegating certain judicial functions to an administrative law judge).
181 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37 (1932); see alsoJames E. Pfander, ArticleI
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and theJudicialPower of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643, 748 (2004) ("Article III adjuncts, as recognized in Crowel must undergo relatively searching review [in an Article III court] essentially comparable to direct appellate review.").
182 Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co. 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982).
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removal would be favored. The underlying rationale is simple: the
greater the range of "federal" cases entrusted to a state agency, the
more isolated the federal judiciary becomes from its protectorate.
This section of the inquiry acknowledges that a limited delegation of
jurisdiction to an agency is less dangerous than a broad delegation.
Accordingly, if the state determines that efficiency, expertise, or other
interests (examined more closely in the third section of the inquiry)
necessitate a limited delegation ofjurisdiction to an agency, such a limited delegation will not be subject to removal. On the other hand,
because the inquiry favors removal in the case of a broaddelegation of
jurisdiction, the state will be prevented from shielding an unduly
broad range of "federal" cases from removal by vesting jurisdiction in
agencies.
2.

Nature of the Right To Be Adjudicated

The second part of the inquiry would examine the nature of the
right to be adjudicated by the state agency. This section distinguishes
public rights from private rights. Private rights are seen as belonging
to the individual; they include an "individual's common law rights in
property and bodily integrity, as well as in enforcing contracts."'183
Public rights, by contrast, are not seen as belonging to the individual,
but rather to the "body politic."'1 84 These public rights "may include

interests generally shared, such as those in the free navigation of
waterways, passage on public highways, and general compliance with
regulatory law.'

85

Under this second section of the inquiry, whether removal is
favored is dependent upon this distinction between private rights and
public rights. If the agency is adjudicating a private-rights dispute,
removal is favored. Conversely, if the agency is adjudicating a publicrights dispute, removal is not favored. The ultimate rationale is to
preserve the essential role of the federal courts. Because private-rights
disputes are at the "'core' of matters normally reserved to Article III
courts," 1 8 6

keeping the route from the state agency to federal court

open makes sense when the agency is handling such a dispute.

183
MIcH.
184
185
186

Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine, 102
L. REv. 689, 693 (2004).
See id.
Id.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.
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Concerns Which Drove the State Legislature to Depart from
Use of a State Court

Finally, the inquiry will examine the concerns which drove the
state legislature to depart from use of a state court and to vestjurisdiction in an agency. If the state has valid reasons for using an administrative forum, removal will not be favored. On the other hand, if the
state lacks valid reasons for shifting jurisdiction to an agency as
opposed to a court, then removal will be favored. In Schor, the
7
Supreme Court recognized efficiency-based concerns as legitimate. 1 8
This suggests that when state legislatures employ agencies as "inexpensive and expeditious"' 8 8 fora, removal will not lie. Beyond efficiencybased concerns, other considerations should be recognized as legitimate state concerns-for instance, the desire to capitalize on agency
expertise and to create innovative remedial schemes. The goal is to
permit removal from state agencies only in those relatively narrow circumstances in which the delegation ofjurisdiction to the agency poses
a threat to the core role of the federal judiciary. Limited delegations
supported by legitimate state concerns such as efficiency, expertise
and innovation will be left untouched by removal.
D. Advantages of the Schor Approach
The modified Schor inquiry presented here offers several advantages. It effectively sorts through both the separation of powers and
federalism concerns presented by the agency removal problem.
Moreover, it resolves some of the uncertainty presented by the current
functional approach; no longer do courts have to wonder whether the
test is meant to be a global or dispute-specific one. Lastly, in one
sense, the modified Schor inquiry looks deeper into the agency
removal problem than the current functional approach-the new
inquiry swaps consideration of state agencies' "surface features" for
consideration of structural principles.
The new approach aids in disentangling the horizontal separation of powers concerns and vertical federalism concerns that run
through the agency removal problem. With regard to separation of
powers concerns, the inquiry recognizes that too much "sideways"
shifting of jurisdiction to state agencies from state courts has implications for the federal courts. When this "sideways" shifting ofjurisdic187 See id. at 855 (noting that in passing legislation delegating jurisdiction to the
Commodities Trading Futures Commission, Congress "intended to create an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum").
188 Id.

2308

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

84:5

tion to agencies occurs, the federal courts potentially become cut off
from many "federal" cases, as removal generally does not provide an
effective link between state agencies and federal courts.
The inquiry also responds to the federalism concerns presented
by the agency removal problem. Courts have hesitated to read the
removal statute to permit removal from state agencies for fear of
preventing states from instituting innovative administrative remedies
whenever original jurisdiction in a federal court would lie.'1 9 In the
words of one court, a reading of the removal statute which foreclosed
such opportunities for innovative remedies in the state administrative
arena would be a "bold and bizarre" one. 190 Accordingly, the modified inquiry recognizes that there are valid reasons to shift a limited
range of jurisdiction to a state agency. Such a limited delegation of
judicial power to state agencies when supported by legitimate state
concerns will not be subject to removal, thereby encouraging state
innovation. Federalism is thus served by leaving limited delegations of
judicial power, which are supported by legitimate state concerns,
untouched by removal. Ultimately, the state is left relatively free to
craft its own distribution of disputes among courts and agencies. The
modified inquiry will only subject agency adjudications to removal
where, on balance, there is a broad transfer of jurisdiction to a state
agency involving private-rights disputes and unsupported by legitimate state concerns.
The modified Schor inquiry proposed in this Part remains a functional one, but solves some of the practical difficulties of the current
functional approach. 19 1 As discussed above, the current functional
approach has not been applied in a uniform manner-in some cases,
courts ask whether the agency as a whole functions as a state court; in
others, courts ask whether the agency in adjudicating the particular
dispute functions as a state court. 192 In short, there is disagreement as
to whether the approach should be global or dispute specific. 193 The
modified Schor inquiry solves this problem; the first factor expressly
designates the subject of the inquiry. The court is to look to the
nature of the jurisdictional grant-a broad grant favors removal, a
narrow one does not.' 9 4 Thus, the ambiguity presented by the current
189 See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d
1280, 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2002).
190 See id.
191 See supra Part II (examining the current functional test and cataloging difficulties which are presented by the test).
192 See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
193 See id.
194 See supra Part III.C.1.
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functional approach is resolved. Courts need not question whether
they should look to the whole of the agency or to how the agency
handles the particular dispute. The subject of the inquiry is clearthe breadth of the jurisdictional grant.
Moreover, the modified inquiry permits courts to probe the
agency removal problem more deeply than the current functional
approach. The current functional approach is occupied, at least partially, with "surface considerations. " 1 95 The test, by considering the
state agency's functions, powers, and procedures, is largely asking:
Does this agency "look" like a court? Does it use an adversarial
approach? Are parties represented by counsel? Does the adjudicator
have legal expertise similar to that of a judge? While the current
inquiry is concerned with whether the agency "looks" like a court, the
modified Schor inquiry moves beyond surface considerations to structural considerations. The modified inquiry asks: Does the state's delegation of jurisdiction to a state agency detract from core functions of
the federal judiciary? With this new approach, removal does not rest
on whether agencies "look" like courts, but rather on whether agencies are unreasonably supplanting courts, to the detriment of the federal judiciary.
While it hardly could be argued that the modified Schor inquiry
provides a perfect resolution to the agency removal problem, the new
approach is an improvement over the current tests. The Schor inquiry
recognizes federal courts become cut off from cases which are shifted
"sideways" by a state legislature to a state agency, and so it provides for
removal from agencies-but only in limited circumstances. Removal
will only be permitted where there is a broad delegation of privaterights disputes to an agency, without legitimate concerns necessitating
the use of an agency. Further, the new approach solves the "global"
or "dispute specific" problem presented by the current functional
approach by expressly making the subject of the inquiry the breadth
of the jurisdictional grant. Lastly, the new approach is capable of
probing the agency removal problem more deeply; the removal determination now rests not upon surface considerations, but rather structural considerations.
CONCLUSION

The federal courts have developed two distinct approaches to
removal from state administrative agencies. The formalist approach
expressly disallows removal of any action commenced in an agency
195

See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
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based on the plain text of the removal statute, which permits removal
only from a "State court.' 96 The opposing approach is premised on a
functional definition of "State court"; a state agency may meet this
definition if its functions, powers, and procedures are court-like and
the respective state and federal interests suggest that a federal court is
197
a proper forum for resolution of the dispute.
Neither approach completely resolves the issue of removal from
state agencies. The formalist approach's complete disallowance of
agency removal is difficult to reconcile with modern agencies that are
structured similarly to courts and do much the same work as courts,
hearing the same types of matters. 19 8 The functional approach recognizes that modern agencies can parallel courts, but presents
unresolved difficulties in how to assess if a particular state agency is
truly functioning as a "State court" for the purposes of the removal
statute.199
A better resolution of the agency removal problem is possible.
The problem, by its nature, involves allocation ofjurisdiction, not only
among different branches of government on the state level, but allocation of jurisdiction among the respective state and federal systems.
The modified Schor inquiry embraces this multi-dimensional aspect of
the agency removal problem and seeks to provide a proper resolution.
Facing removal from an agency, the court will look to whether the
state has elected to shift a sizeable amount of "federal" cases to agencies, whether the right being adjudicated is a private one, and lastly
whether the legitimate concerns justify the shift of jurisdiction.
This inquiry resolves many competing concerns. Agency removal
will be permitted in relatively narrow circumstances, leaving states free
to create innovative administrative schemes and to craft their own distributions of jurisdiction among agencies and courts. The states are
thus left unhindered by excessive removal from agency adjudications,
but the interests of the federal judiciary are also served. Removal
from an agency will be a relative rarity, preventing a "flooding" of the
federal courts, yet removal will remain an effective "link" from the
state system, preventing isolation of the federal courts.
Application of the new approach presented here will largely
retain the status quo. Few sitting on the federal bench will be
required to adjudicate a dispute originating in a state administrative
196 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (2006). For a discussion of the formalist approach, see
supra Part I.A.
197 See supra Part H.A.
198 See supra Part I.B.
199 See supra Part I.B.
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agency. Moreover, no revolution in our thinking will result-we will
continue to perceive federal courts and state administrative agencies
as entities secluded from one another. However, when the Schor factors do happen to align, the new approach ensures a needed link
between state agencies and the federal courts.
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